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The Egyptian revolution exposed the deficiencies
of development policies as it toppled the Egyptian
regime. This people’s movement espoused the
values of rights, dignity and democracy that are
the same principles that inform the rights-based
development paradigm and ensuing programmes,
and which have been strongly propagated in
Egypt for many years, with little resonance
among the public. This article considers the
implications of what we know of this Egyptian
revolution to the paradigm of human
development and to its modes of operation and
funding, by focusing specifically on questions of
women’s empowerment and gender equity.
For decades, development paradigms and
programmes have adopted the values of human
wellbeing and dignity, which are both profoundly
political projects, while at the same time
pretending that development is an apolitical
venture. This paradox is evinced by the ability of
development practitioners to claim that their
rights-driven programmes have had impacts and
successes even when these self-same programmes
existed in the midst of autocratic and unjust
polities. Egypt is a contentious and critical case in
point. There is a blurred divide between
development as a process that is respectful of
sovereignty, even if it is externally funded, and as
an intervention that is enabling Egyptians to
challenge state hegemony (Mitchell 1995).
Gender and development programmes provide
an illustration of such contradictions in practice.
On the one hand, the Egyptian state was party to
most relevant universal declarations and
conventions on gender rights and equality. On
the other hand, the space to claim these rights
was constricted by a state-led hegemony over
civilian and public spaces. Meanwhile,
development agents, funders and practitioners
were lost between the micro-level at which their
programmes seemed to work and were defined as
apolitical spaces, and the macro-political level at
which the only changes were those effected by
state fiat and not by citizen actions. Despite the
many seemingly successful projects on the
ground on the micro-level, and the seemingly
progressive initiatives of state elites on the
macro-level, gender justice remained ever
elusive. Yet the revolution represented a
disconnect with the status quo, albeit temporary.
The equality agenda after the revolution, it will
be argued, is up for grabs and is concomitant on
a number of integral factors.
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Abstract The people’s solidarity in search for rights, dignity and justice in the days of the uprising against
Mubarak’s regime challenged the assumptions guiding the gender and development paradigm. Women who
participated in their thousands trod very different paths from those engineered by gender and development
policy advocates, about how to support women to engage politically. It highlighted more than ever, the
limitations of previous approaches that supported an apolitical gender and development agenda in an
authoritarian regime. This article argues that in post-revolutionary Egypt, gendered work is no longer the
exclusive realm of development and is expressing itself differently, through political party activism and
religious philanthropy charity. The extent to which a gender equality agenda will develop forcefully will
depend on the nature of the state system, the extent to which there will be avenues for political
engagement outside development, and the extent to which philanthropic organisations will assume centre
stage in engaging with women’s needs as religious subjects.
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2 The people’s moment
There were whole families, including small
children and their mothers, sleeping in Tahrir
Square during 28 January–11 February 2011 and
there were hundreds, if not thousands, of women
involved in organising supplies, medication,
banners, marches, international contacts and
general mobilisation for this movement. The
array of dress codes during those days in so many
squares and cities in Egypt was in itself telling.
There were veiled women who covered their face,
or just their hair or appeared unveiled. There
were women alone, with children, the very young
and the elderly all standing in solidarity together.
The involvement of workers, Muslim Brothers,
liberals, leftists and even men and women who
had no political creed of any kind pointed to the
vibrant people’s solidarity that was a feature of
the protests that consolidated a revolution in
Egypt.
Women’s significant participation as described
above has, perhaps inadvertently, discredited
formal politics and the development programmes
that have sought to make it the exclusive focus of
their interventions to empower women
politically. This critical role played by women as
bloggers, as activists, as protestors, as voices of
anger and discontent, contrasts deeply with the
labours of gender justice bureaucracies, whether
para-governmental or non-governmental, to
involve women in politics. The narrative on voice
and women’s empowerment spoken in the
language of development was all about
parliamentary quotas and the necessity of
‘creating’ local women leaders who could contest
elections and then, by winning seats in councils
or parliaments, participate in politics and make
the process less patriarchal. Women’s political
engagement and their collective action are items
on a development agenda that seeks to give
women ‘voice’ and achieve the political
empowerment of women (Goetz and Nyamu
2008). Some have analysed the nature and
patterns of women’s engagement in social
movements, different mobilisation strategies
used by feminists in their engagement with the
state and the impact of transnational linkages on
feminist movement (Batliwala 2010).
This literature that espouses collective action as
an avenue to empowerment is not developmental
but feminist in its origins. However, a
development formula focused on state-based
arrangements can ensure women’s
representation in legislative and executive
bodies and consequently, pursue a policy of
introducing quotas and shattering glass ceilings.
This logic may at some level be sound but the 60
or so women who had just ‘won’ parliamentary
seats in December 2010 were discredited by the
events of January 2011 and so was the
assumption that women leaders had to be
‘trained’ to engage politically. The women on the
squares of Egypt decimated the work on ‘voice’
and women’s political participation enacted in
programmes initiated by the National Council
for Women led by the First Lady and by various
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Quotas in a rigged election, access to high office
in the absence of transparency and
accountability, local council representation
without good governance or voice without
freedom do not deliver gender justice. The
recommended recipes that are the agendas of
development programmes fade when faced with
a mass quest for dignity and choice.
3 The post-Mubarak reality
When the President of Egypt was ousted from
power on 11 February, the whole country began a
transition to an unknown territory called
‘democracy’. It was on 8 March that the
problems of gender injustices resurfaced when
women’s groups and individuals went to
downtown Cairo and to Tahrir Square to
commemorate International Women’s Day and
were attacked and hounded out of the square
that was supposed to be the ‘labour ward’ in
which democracy had been reborn in Egypt.
Meanwhile, calls to repeal all of the gains made
for women in the past decades resounded in the
media and in legal courts. The National Council
for Women led by Mrs Mubarak had indeed
participated in realising the changes that women
activists had called for; changes that are in-line
with the principles of international covenants and
conventions such as the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW). The rights to mobility, political
representation as a fixed quota, unilateral
divorce, and the criminalisation of female genital
mutilations were all ‘wins’ made under
authoritarianism. A leading judge who had
presided over the family courts created to realise
a fairer judicial process for children and women
in cases of divorce, became the leading anti-
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family courts proponent. A new civil society
organisation for ‘Family Protection’ came into
being under his auspices and is calling for a
repeal of the right for women to unilateral
divorce (known as ‘Khol’), reducing the age of
custody to seven years, after which the father has
automatic guardianship of children1 and the
return of the institution of ‘beit el Ta’a’ whereby
the police can force women who wish to leave the
marital home to return to the husband! Sharmani
(2011) has rejected claims that the laws that deny
women their rights and dignity are grounded in
religious principles or traditions. She argues that
the current debate has elided Fiqh and Sharia so
as to make the interpretations of scholars the
same as the eternal principles suggested by the
Sharia as a basis for jurisprudence. In other
words, Sharmani argues that the U-turn in terms
of personal status laws, if it happens, will reflect
patriarchal and not sacred choices!
The successive ministerial cabinets formed since
11 February have only one female minister, a
stalwart of the past and current regimes and a
much-respected diplomat and excellent
administrator, but not a feminist activist.
Parliamentary quotas for women have been
scrapped and no women were included in the
committee that was formed in February to
suggest a roadmap for a transition to a new
democratic state and constitution. The National
Council for Women has been effectively
disbanded and there is no alternative counterpart
to act as a national mechanism for women.
On the other hand, tens of political parties have
been formed, each with a women’s committee
and all formed with the significant involvement
of women who hold key positions in these new
political parties (except perhaps the ‘Salafi’
parties). Moreover the activists, bloggers,
protestors and agitators are still present on the
political scene and are still voicing demands for
democracy and against autocracy. Women’s
groups are also participating in vibrant debates
about the new constitution and legal reforms and
advocating legal and constitutional justice,
including striving for civil personal status codes.
Contestations around women’s strategic
entitlements are taking place at one level and
among various political actors and activists but
the basic needs of women and families have also
emerged after the revolution, in a new light.
The raison d’être for many development projects
has been the provision of basic needs to poor
Egyptians. The basic needs approach that has
been at the core of much development work has
provided a moral urgency to development
interventions (Sholkamy 2009). Although basic
rights to food, shelter, education, health and
work were enshrined in the Constitution of 1971
(now suspended), the Egyptian state has never
been able to keep up with the needs of a rapidly
growing population and the rising rates of
poverty and vulnerability. Egypt is not an aid-
dependent country and the majority of
investments for development are national ones;
however, funding for gender equity projects such
as reproductive health, female political
participation and microcredit tended to be
driven, funded and/or promoted through
international monies.
The funding for a great deal of gender work that
aimed to fulfil both strategic and basic needs of
women came through aid and grants and often
pursued muddled objectives. For example,
support for the creation of national women’s
‘machinery’ supplied a strategic interest that
gave women a voice in government but the
projects of this machinery included microcredit,
training, crafts, health promotion and other
poverty alleviation interventions. The council did
succeed in effective change at the macro-level
and making a dent in patriarchal and unjust legal
and administrative arrangements and regimes,
but the urge to demonstrate an impact ‘on the
ground’ and among the poor justified the work of
the council and made their political impact
palatable to the general public. Indeed even at
the international and national level, feminists
and gender and development bureaucrats have
been using the sugar coating of basic needs to
promote strategic ends! And, hence, the mingling
of reproductive rights with the population control
agenda, of women’s right to work with economic
growth and women’s political participation with
peace building and democratisation. This mix has
created unlikely alliances including one between
proponents of neoliberal agendas and feminism
(Sholkamy 2009).2
This alignment of interests, however, has its
limits. And nowhere are these limits more
evident than in the poverty alleviation debate.
The conflation of poverty alleviation and citizen
empowerment (particularly women’s
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empowerment) may make sense to the
development project but not necessarily to that
of philanthropy. Development as freedom, to
borrow a term that is much celebrated, and
freedom from poverty or need are not the same
objectives. These two approaches belong to
divergent, at times contradictory philosophical,
moral and political traditions. Freedom from
want can supply people with their basic needs
but can also place them in the precarious
positions of dependency and patronage.
Development as freedom means freedom from
want and freedom from political injustice and
dependence. Thus, access to information in India
became an anti-poverty intervention as the Right
to Information Act became the bedrock for more
transparent and rights-based social
interventions. Development paradigms are
critically subjected to innovative political and
scholarly thinking. This literature creates new
parameters for new thinking and innovative
action. Unfortunately, the world of philanthropy
is not similarly constrained by dominant political
discourse. Philanthropy is not subject to the
regime of rights and entitlements. It can choose
to confirm hierarchical relationships or craft
client patron ones, since compliance with rights-
based approaches is optional for philanthropists.
4 Equality ‘up for grabs’
The transitional period will end after the
parliamentary and presidential elections take
place in 2011/12 and culminate in a new
constitution. Meanwhile, the scene is both
stagnant and strange. The air is suffused with a
negative energy, thanks to persistent media
campaigns that have focused on real and perceived
corruption, lost money and injustices. Meanwhile,
new and old oppositions are fragmented in their
views and engagements with the future as per the
discord concerning the position and decisions of
the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) and the limited interest or involvement
they have in managing the transition. The current
civilian authority (i.e. the government) also seems
feeble and hesitant.
It is difficult to read beyond these parameters.
This article will conclude with an account of the
adjustments that will necessitate a response and
transformation or revision of gender and
development work in Egypt, although the
situation could change quickly and undermine
the validity of this analysis. There are three
‘adjustments’ that will shape and give meaning
to Egypt’s development path after the revolution. 
The first is the impact of the revolution on the
nature and identity of the future state and the
challenge to civil society.
The second adjustment concerns the overhaul of
women’s representation and the situation of
national ‘machineries’. Women’s groups need to
also contend with the distinction between rights
and needs, which will come to haunt
development practitioners as they reformulate
and reorient their work.
The third concerns the position of women in a
free society, one which does not necessarily
espouse values of gender equality. There already
is evidence of a paradigm shift whereby
perceptions of the strategic and practical needs
and rights of women are becoming less
‘developmental’ and more political on the one
hand, insofar as political parties and agents are
adopting this agenda, and on the other hand
more charitable as philanthropy assumes the
mantel of do-gooder and provider.
A climate of suspicion and angst reigns over
questions of sovereignty and self-determination,
which will impact the gender and development
policies of Egypt, since the development world
relies on civil society, donor funding and
international agendas, and all three have been
the subject of much speculation regarding their
role in the revolution and where their allegiances
lie. Of course state involvement with bilateral
and multilateral donors still exists but the
current situation will make it difficult to create
new partners, more progressive or innovative
programmes or creative projects because of this
atmosphere of conspiratorial thinking. This
situation is an example of the first adjustment
and shows the need for a rapid reappraisal of the
relations that govern development work.
The second adjustment involves the situation
with national machinery and women’s
representation. The revolution discredited and
decimated the National Democratic Party (NDP)
and its acolytes. The National Council for
Women was one of the institutions that fell first,
since its premises were inside the building of the
NDP, which was torched on Friday, 28 January
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2011. This symbolic and actual demise has made
it difficult to resuscitate the organisation.
The council still exists but has relocated and is
keeping a low profile until the term of its current
board and secretary general end in December
2011. There is no alternative structure in place
and attempts to create a commission for women
have failed. The revolution has also brought
politics back to life and with it have emerged tens
of new political parties with women’s committees
and groups. These nascent organisations and
groupings have yet to be studied or understood.
At an anecdotal level, they seem to be constituted
of feminist civil society activists and some
academics. They may have an impact on
representation and voice that has yet to become
apparent. What seems to be clear however, is that
quotas for women have been watered down to
symbolic representations on party lists and those
parties are not nominating women for fear of
losing the elections.
The third adjustment concerns the rising poverty
rates and the basic needs of women. The
Egyptian economy is suffering in this time of
turbulent transition. Some 60–70 per cent of
Egyptians in the labour force are employed in
the informal sector and it is this sector that is
suffering the most and benefiting the least from
the revolutionary calls for social justice.
Philanthropic organisations are beginning to
re-assume the mantle of social protection and
provide alms, transfers and services and so
create wide circles of clients and followers. The
poor, specifically women, are being serviced by
mostly religious organisations that do not use a
rights framework to address people’s needs. This
may well be the worst outcome of the revolution,
since this clientelism and making poverty a
religious domain may set the gender agenda
back decades because it reinforces stereotypical
gender roles and a highly patriarchal gender
division of labour.
What are the lessons of the revolution for the
study of women’s empowerment? This question
needs further reflection but it is certain and
clear that the revolution will change the world of
development in Egypt in general, and will also
have a profound impact on gender justice. There
is already evidence of a paradigm shift, whereby
perceptions of the strategic and practical needs
and rights of women are becoming either less
‘developmental’ and more political or
increasingly philanthropic and charitable.
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Notes
1 The age now is 15 years, unless children want
to live with their father.
2 No cynicism is intended from this observation.
At one level, these alliances have had a great
impact on the realisation of gender justice
and have managed to bring change to policy
circles that led to actual commitment or lip
service to the idea of social and gender justice.
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